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ABSTRACT
Due to the shortcomings of modern Mobile Device Management solutions, busi-
nesses have begun to incorporate forensics to analyze their mobile devices and respond
to any incidents of malicious activity in order to protect their sensitive data. Current
forensic tools, however, can only look a static image of the device being examined,
making it difficult for a forensic analyst to produce conclusive results regarding the
integrity of any sensitive data on the device. This research thesis expands on the
use of forensics to secure data by implementing an agent on a mobile device that can
continually collect information regarding the state of the device. This information is
then sent to a separate server in the form of log files to be analyzed using a specialized
tool. The analysis tool is able to look at the data collected from the device over time
and perform specific calculations, according to the user’s specifications, highlighting
any correlations or anomalies among the data which might be considered suspicious
to a forensic analyst. The contribution of this paper is both an in-depth explanation
on the implementation of an iOS application to be used to improve the mobile foren-
sics process as well as a proof-of-concept experiment showing how evidence collected
over time can be used to improve the accuracy of a forensic analysis.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become a critical tool for any modern employee. Companies
typically want their employees to quickly communicate information related to their
business goals, and as a result each employee will often store sensitive company in-
formation on his or her device. Naturally this information needs to be secured, so
businesses will often utilize Mobile Device Management (MDM) software to ensure
that their sensitive data is protected. One of the key aspects of MDM software is the
security features that they offer, namely allowing encryption of sensitive data, remote
locking, and remote wiping; however, even with these features in place, attackers have
still been able to breach devices that use MDM software through vulnerabilities in
the operating system and privilege escalation [1]. Even though no system is ever com-
pletely secure, many companies are solely reliant on MDM software for their security
needs, and because of this they have no set course of action for when their sensitive
information is compromised [2].
Computer Forensics is a discipline that involves obtaining and analyzing computer
data for judicial purposes. Typically computer forensics techniques are only used in
solving computer-related crimes; however, they can also be used as a possible solu-
tion for the lack of intrusion detection measures present in a lot of MDM software.
In [3], Scholnick states the use of forensic methods is one of two primary weapons
that businesses have for protecting enterprise security because it provides “eviden-
tiary discovery.” In other words, companies can use forensic methods to find evidence
of malicious activity and then respond once they determine that their sensitive in-
formation may have been compromised. Our approach expands on this premise by
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implementing a system that would allow for a more accurate assessment of the state
of a mobile device.
One common security mechanism of Mobile Device Management tools is to pre-
vent the installation of any third-party application [1]; however, this sort-of defense
mechanism typically relies on signature verification and can be bypassed if additional
checks are not in place. Such is the case with Gatekeeper program on OSX which
protects the system by only allowing programs that are signed by known third-party
developers to run. According to an article by Edward Kovacs [4], the Gatekeeper pro-
gram does not check all included, externally-referenced binaries, which means that an
attacker could replace a non-malicious binary, that’s being externally-referenced by
a signed application, with a malicious binary, and the signed application would still
execute it. Because MDM systems use an application validation mechanism similar to
that used by the Gatekeeper program for OSX, it follows that a similar attack would
be possible on iOS, assuming that an approved application that runs the external
binary can be installed on the device. Additionally, due to MDM’s lack of intrusion
detection, the victims would likely not be able to determine the cause of the attack.
Using forensic techniques, however, a user might be able to gather evidence to piece
together a story about the origins of any recent malicious activity on the device.
In the case of the Gatekeeper vulnerability, for example, a user could use forensic
techniques to see which processes had recently been launched and are currently using
system memory. He or she could then check to see if any processes had similar launch
times, which would indicate that they were related, and from there begin to speculate
that a malicious process was launched from a non-malicious one.
Access Data’s Mobile Phone Examiner Plus (MPEPlus) is one of the most widely-
used mobile forensic tools, and it is a good example of software that a business’s
security manager could use to extract data from a device to investigate whether or not
2
the sensitive information on their devices had been compromised. Although the data
extraction methods vary depending on what types of operating systems are running
on the devices being examined, extracting data using MPEPlus typically works by
installing a temporary agent on the mobile device and then transferring all accessible
files to a logical image of the device on the host computer which can then be explored
using the tool. Once all data has been extracted from the mobile device, a forensic
examiner can then search through the various files, logs, and databases in an attempt
to find any evidence of malicious activity. For example, if after extracting all data
from a mobile device an analyst saw that several unrecognized SMS messages had
been sent to an unrecognized number and that an application with an unrecognized
publisher was installed on the device, the analyst could conjecture that a malicious
application had been installed on the device which was sending SMS messages for
nefarious purposes.
Although tools like MPEPlus can be used to help identify whether or not a busi-
ness’s devices have been compromised, and even though the collected evidence may
seem somewhat suspicious to an analyst, often times he or she may not have enough
information to draw a definitive conclusion about the integrity of the data on the
device. When considering the example with the unrecognized application and unrec-
ognized SMS recipient, although the examiner could suspect that the unrecognized
application was a malicious application responsible for sending the SMS messages,
there is no evidence that those two factors are necessarily related. Another possibil-
ity could be that the user simply let someone else use the device to contact someone
that the user did not recognize. If this were the case, then there would not be enough
data for an analyst to confidently draw a conclusion. If, however, the analyst also
had a time-line of events showing that the unrecognized recipient was contacted via
SMS at the same times that the unrecognized application was active, then the evi-
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dence would be more complete, and the analyst could more confidently conclude that
the application may be malicious. Similarly, in the case of bypassing the Gatekeeper
program in OSX, although the user can use forensic techniques to speculate that
a malicious process may be linked to a non-malicious process, he or she may not
have enough information to make that conclusion definitively, but with a time-line of
events, the user might be able to see a consistent pattern of a specific process being
launched in conjunction with another process.
As described in the paper by Paglierani et al. in any forensic investigation, the
investigators should ensure that any collected evidence adheres to the four major
rules of evidence [5]:
1. Authenticity — The evidence can be linked to a specific individual or incident.
2. Admissibility — The evidence was legally obtained and can be admitted in a
court.
3. Completeness — The evidence is not partial; it includes all available informa-
tion.
4. Reliability / Accuracy — The evidence collection procedure is explainable.
Our approach focuses primarily on improving the completeness of the evidence
that can be collected from a mobile device. In contrast to incomplete evidence, com-
plete evidence is capable of aiding an analyst in drawing conclusions about an event
or series of events with a high level of confidence. Although a commercial tool like
MPEPlus can certainly offer an analyst insight as to whether or not malicious activ-
ity had occurred on a mobile device, the analyst often times is unable to confidently
draw conclusions about specific events due to only having glimpses of what took
place, i.e. the analyst only has partial evidence. How then can forensics be used to
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help an analyst definitively determine the integrity of the data on a mobile device?
The answer, as previously mentioned, is that the analyst needs to be able to look
at the events that transpire over a period of time. In other words, there needs to
be a way to continuously collect information about the state of the device over time
and order the events along a time-line which can be forensically examined. Scholnick
mentions this in his article when talking about comprehensive monitoring and track-
ing capabilities [3]. Our approach discussed in this thesis uses similar techniques for
enhancing the completeness of the forensic evidence, allowing an analyst to have a
more comprehensive understanding of the events that transpired.
It seems somewhat obvious that continuously collecting information is advanta-
geous for an analyst compared to only gaining a snapshot of the information through a
commercial tool like MPEPlus; however, there are various restrictions that make this
approach challenging. One of the restrictions, which will be discussed in more detail
later, is the sandboxing mechanism for the iOS platform which limits our continuous
collection of data by allowing us to collect only specific types of information from iOS
devices. Another restriction is that with iOS, the kind of methods required to even
obtain the limited information available would cause any application in which they
are implemented to be rejected from the official application store, making deployment
of the application impractical. It is still possible, however, to use a development li-
cense to install such an application on actual iOS devices, and this sort of deployment
mechanism is much more feasible in a corporation setting, which is the setting from
which the motivation for our approach originated. Additionally, although the data we
can collect is limited, it is useful in that it still can give an analyst further insight into
the events that transpired on the device to some degree if used alongside a commercial
forensics tool. Furthermore, our approach not only demonstrates how continual data
collection is useful in spite of these restrictions, it also shows specifically how a more
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complete data set can be used to improve the accuracy and efficiency of a forensic
analysis.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
The aim of some of the more recent advancements in mobile forensics techniques is to
provide forensic analysts with ways to draw accurate, complete conclusions regarding
the events that occurred on the device based on the extracted evidence. As mentioned
previously, one of the most recent advancements involves continuously monitoring the
mobile device and collecting information from it; however, with this advancement, it
is important to know precisely what information to collect. This research thesis
focuses primarily on advancing mobile forensics on the iOS platform, so in order to
ensure optimal development for this advancement in mobile forensics, we needed to
have an understanding of various threats and attacks targeted at the iOS platform
in addition to any threats that could impact mobile devices in general. The study of
these threats, in addition to our Preliminary Investigation discussed in section 7.1,
are what helped us determine what types of information are essential in conducting
a mobile forensics investigation.
One type of threat is discussed in [6], the authors describe how users often times
inherently trust the host that is providing a mobile device with power via a USB
connection, and as a result, make themselves vulnerable to unapproved installation of
malicious applications on their devices. By using the same communication protocols
as iTunes, the authors were able to obtain the device’s UDID using their proof-
of-concept malicious charger host. They then created a provisioning profile which
they could use to install any iOS application on a victim’s device, bypassing the
vetting process of the iOS AppStore. Knowing the mechanisms of this type of attack,
we need to determine what information we should continually try to obtain from
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an iOS device to aid a forensic analyst in drawing accurate conclusions. Although
there are limitations to the information we are able to extract, which is discussed
later in chapter 5, we can see that much of the success of this type of attack would
depend on the user being unable to identify a malicious application running on his
or her device. Continuously obtaining information about the running processes on
the device, however, would allow an analyst to identify a malicious process belonging
to a malicious application or an unusual parent process to a particular application
which could lead to the conclusion that a malicious application has been running on
the device.
Collecting information about the currently running processes on the device could
also prove useful in defending against attacks by malicious applications downloaded
from the official application store. In [7] the authors describe how it is possible for
malicious applications to gain approval to be placed on the official iOS application
store. This can be done by dynamically loading private APIs and then obfuscating the
instructions in the source code that do the dynamic loading. Private APIs can allow
for certain malicious activities to be carried out, such as programatically sending SMS
messages from the device, and obfuscating the instructions responsible for loading
those APIs allows the application to hide its malicious intentions from static analysis
tools. These malicious applications, however, would likely not be able to hide their
malicious intentions from an analyst who is able to view a history of the device’s
currently running processes. In regards to the example given in the paper by Han
et. al., a malicious application that sends premium rate SMS messages using the
device’s SMS service could easily be detected over time since the “mobileSMS” process
would be running whenever a message is sent. It would seem then that continuously
collecting information about the currently running processes on a device is highly
beneficial since it is useful in detecting mobile malware applications which are capable
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of infecting a device different ways.
Another attack discussed in [8] by Tielei et al. shows how through the use of
return-oriented programming (ROP), applications that are seemingly benign can pass
the vetting process for the iOS Appstore only later to dynamically load private APIs
triggered by some form of remote signal. Essentially any iOS app that attempts to
load private APIs for cross-application communication will be quickly rejected by the
AppStore once they are submitted, but by using ROP and control-flow hijacking, an
attacker can bypass this measure and still use private API’s and carry out malicious
operations on the device such as sending emails, posting tweets, and sending SMS
messages without the user’s knowledge. Like with the previous attack, in order to
improve the mobile forensic process, we need to consider what information we should
continuously try to extract from an iOS device for an analyst to be able to identify
this type of attack. Again because the attack revolves around placing a malicious
payload onto a victim device, gathering process information over time would be useful
in identifying potentially malicious applications, since the process used to launch
the malicious application would only appear when the attack is being carried out.
Additionally, because the end goal of this type of malicious application mentioned
in the paper is to perform malicious operations, an analyst may also be able to
identify those operations through the listed process IDs obtained from the extracted
information and conclude that this type of attack is being carried out. Extracting
network information could also be of use since it seems that the Jekyll application
relies on placing vulnerabilities in the source code that can be exploited remotely. If
an analyst is able to see both the running processes and any IP addresses that are
actively trying to communicate with the device during the time of the attack, then
he or she could potentially deduce that the attack is being carried out by correlating
suspicious process information with suspicious network information.
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In addition to platform specific attacks, to make our approach as robust as possi-
ble, we need to also consider attacks that are generic to all devices, such as network-
based attacks, and continuously collect pertinent information accordingly. In [9]
Cassola et al. discuss an “Evil Twin” network attack which can impact any type of
wireless computer regardless of operating system. In the paper the authors describe
that the “Evil Twin” attack consists of setting up a rogue wireless network that has
an indistinguishable SSID from a valid wireless network. They consider a system
where the valid network uses a valid authentication server and a valid certification
authority to ensure normal users that the network that they are attempting to con-
nect to is trustworthy. In the attack, the attacker establishes a rogue access point,
a rogue authentication server and a rogue certification authority to mimic the valid
system without raising any suspicion from the user. The attack proceeds by using
what the authors call “reactive jamming,” making it so that the wireless signal from
the valid network is not detected by the victim user. Because the rogue network has
the same SSID as the valid network as well as a certificate signed by a certificate
authority, the user unwittingly connects to the rogue network at which point the
attacker can obtain a hash of the user’s credentials for that network. The hash is
then brute-forced to reveal the user’s credentials for the valid network, allowing the
attacker access to the valid network with the same privileges as the user. This attack
effectively demonstrates how any wireless-enabled device can be susceptible to an at-
tack involving a rogue network, and although the goal of the attack mentioned in the
paper was to steal the user’s credentials, the user is prone to additional devastation
by simply connecting to a malicious network. Naturally in order to identify this type
of threat, a forensic analyst would need to have a record of any wireless networks
that the mobile device in question had been connected to, so continuously collecting
current network information such as an access point’s SSID and BSSID would likely
10
prove useful in a forensic analysis.
After exploring several known attacks on mobile devices, and more specifically
iOS devices, it seems that there are a few different types of information that should
be monitored and collected from the device over time including but not limited to:
currently running processes, current network traffic information, and current network
access point information. To reiterate, the reason why continuously collecting infor-
mation from the device over time is useful is because it gives a more complete set
of evidence which then leads to more accurate conclusions about the state of the
device. Bianchi et al. use this same reasoning in [10]. In the paper the authors talk
about how when it comes to rootkits infecting a host machine, there is always some
sort of evidence which can lead to the discovery of their existence. To ensure the
discovery of rootkits, the tool described in the paper performs several different types
of analysis including configuration comparison, code comparison, data comparison,
and kernel entry comparison, and because their approach considers a variety of ways
that a rootkit may attempt to hide its existence, and consequently a variety of dif-
ferent types of information, an investigator can draw accurate conclusions regarding
the existence of rootkits when using their tool. Although this type of data collection
is fairly new to mobile forensics, it is not completely unique to our approach. As
previously mentioned, Scholnick draws attention to the importance of an on-device
monitoring application and how it can potentially enhance forensics in [3]. He states
“The core of any device’s enhanced forensic potential, regardless of OS, will center
on the availability of more comprehensive monitoring and tracking capabilities both
inside the device and at the back end.”
Other parties have made advancements in developing tools that continuously mon-
itor and collect information from mobile devices, operating in a seemingly similar
matter to the tool we developed in our approach. The most notable example of this
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is AccessData’s mobile endpoint monitoring capabilities that have been integrated
into their ResolutionOne platform. According to [11], AccessData’s implementation
“detects unknown threats by providing visibility into network communications and
running processes, so anomalous activities can be identified and remediated.” At the
time of writing this paper, however, no documentation is available regarding how
AccessData’s monitoring application actually operates, and no explanation is given
regarding how a forensic analyst can actually identify the anomalous activities from
the collected data. Other works have shown implementations for monitoring tools on
the Android platform, such as the one discussed in the paper by Grover. In the paper,
Grover talks about the implementation of a tool capable of collecting various types of
evidences over time that can be used in a forensic investigation. Although the paper’s
discussion on monitoring screen lock status begins to show the tool’s effectiveness in
a forensic investigation [12], the tool does not explore methods that an investigator
might use to improve their analysis given the information from the monitoring tool,
whereas our approach does. In addition to offering a detailed explanation of how
such a monitoring tool operates, we also show a proof-of-concept for how precisely an
investigator could use the obtained information to form a more accurate conclusion
of the events that transpire, thus enhancing the forensic analysis.
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Chapter 3
PROPOSED APPROACH
After having discussed both why mobile forensics is important from a security perspec-
tive and how our approach seeks to enhance it, we now discuss our implementation
process for our forensics tool. As mentioned in the previous section, our approach
involves creating an on-device application to continuously gather current running pro-
cess information, current network traffic information and current network access point
information. That information is stored in logs on the device which are then sent to
the server, where a Python script is run to parse the logs. After the server-side script
parses the logs, the user is able to enter parameters to specify which sections of the
collected information to analyze and how any anomalous information should be high-
lighted. This chapter is divided into four sections reflecting the steps in our approach:
the Preliminary Investigation sections describes the background work done before we
began designing our forensics tool; the System Architecture section describes the var-
ious components of our system, their interactions, and their purposes; the On-Device
Application section describes the iOS application we created and some of the tech-
nologies used there-in to accomplish our goals; and the Server-Side Analysis section
describes the analysis program we created as well as how the information is handled
after it is sent from an iOS device to our server.
3.1 Preliminary Investigation
Before we began development of our on-device application, we were approached
by a company that had had some of their sensitive information stolen from their
mobile devices while their employees were on a business trip. They tasked us with
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investigating one of their devices to try to find evidence of a compromise. The device
that we were given to investigate was a 4th generation Apple iPad with Retina Display.
In addition to this device we were also given an Apple iPad 2 which had no alterations
to any of its settings and was supposed to represent a base model to which we were
to compare the 4th generation Apple iPad. We began the investigation by taking
logical images of both the device suspected to have been compromised and the base
model device using AccessData’s Mobile Phone Examiner Plus (MPEPlus) software.
We then browsed through the logical image of the suspected device, seeing what
types of information could be gleaned from a static image. Once we had an idea of
what information MPEPlus was able to offer, we determined which of those types
of information would be useful in figuring out whether or not the device had been
compromised. Looking through all the relevant data extracted from the logical image,
we attempted to find any evidence of malicious activity and tried to form a story of
what malicious event, if any, might have occurred.
One of the pieces of evidence that we collected during our investigation of the
suspected device was the times at which various applications were installed and unin-
stalled. This information was contained in the “MobileInstallation directory,” which
is under the “Logs” directory in the iOS file system and can be seen in Table 3.1.
The reason why we decided that application installation information was relevant to
the investigation was because if a malicious application were installed on the device,
then the time stamp of the installation could potentially be correlated with other ac-
tivity. Additionally, if we saw any anomalies in how long a particular application was
installed, then we would have more reason to be suspicious of that application. For
example, if an application was installed and then uninstalled a few moments later,
then there would be a possibility that it was installed for a few moments only to carry
out malicious instructions. Table 1 shows that a few of the applications were only
14
Application Installation Time Uninstallation Time
com.fmi.afaria Sep 4th, 08:30:17 Sep 4th, 09:04:18
com.verisgin.mvip.iphone Sep 4th, 14:51:17 Sep 4th, 14:53:24
com.sabre.tripcase.prod Sep 7th, 15:17:11 Sep 18th, 23:08:25
com.hbo.hbogo
Sep 18th, 03:15:20 Sep 18th, 05:00:40
Oct 8th, 04:37:00 Oct 14th, 11:27:19
com.amazon.Lassen Sep 5th, 07:43:18 Oct 14th, 11:27:24
com.skype.SkypeForiPad Sep 4th, 07:43:18 Oct 14th, 11:27:26
com.fishdog.hearts2 Sep 6th, 14:51:59 Oct 14th, 11:27:32
com.internationalsos.membership.isos Sep 4th, 15:12:48 Oct 14th, 11:27:34
com.optimesoftware.Backgammon.free Sep 6th, 15:13:01 Oct 14th, 11:27:36
com.pandora Sep 5th, 17:29:58 Oct 14th, 11:27:38
Table 3.1: Mobile Installation Log
installed for a few hours or less, but once we researched the them a bit further, we
found that they were not malicious.
Another piece of evidence we looked at in our preliminary investigation were device
security and user settings, which determined a lot of the allowed actions on the device,
located in the “PublicInfo” directory which is in the “configurationProfiles” directory
in the iOS file system. The rationale behind looking into the user and security settings
was that a malicious application could potentially try to disable specific settings to
allow a malicious instruction set to be carried out, and by comparing the values for
the user and security settings on the suspected device with those on the base-model
device, we could see which settings were different and potentially maliciously altered,
assuming the user did not tamper with the settings.
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One of the more lucrative types of information that we investigated, in terms
of what we were able to deduce about the integrity of the device, was the WiFi
network information. We obtained the WiFi information from a plist file located
in the “SystemConfiguration” directory which is in the “Preferences” directory in
the iOS file system, and from this we were able to extract details about the various
networks that the suspected device had connected to including the network’s SSID,
the BSSID, the channels over which the network was broadcasting, the country code,
the time the device last joined the network, and the time the device last auto-joined
the network. Additionally, elsewhere in the logical image file of the suspected device
we were able to obtain the name of the vendors for each of the wireless routers in the
plist file. Using all of this information, we were able to construct a rough timeline of
networks that the suspected iPad had connected to, but what was most interesting
about the WiFi information was that it revealed a potential rogue access point attack.
Three of the networks that appeared in the WiFi logs had similar SSIDs; they
were “Garden Hotel”, “GardeHotel” without a space character, and “Garden Hotel
Free”, respectively. The access point with the SSID “GardenHotel” and the one with
the SSID “Garden Hotel Free” both were broadcasting on the same channels, had
the same country code, and had the same device vendor. The access point with the
SSID “Garden Hotel” did not share this information with the other networks with
similar SSIDs. Additionally, the “Garden Hotel” access point did not have any value
for a time when the device had last auto-joined that network, meaning that the access
point may only have been available for a short time. This information, seen in Table
3.2, fits a scenario in which an attacker had set up a rogue access point with the SSID
“Garden Hotel” in an attempt to steal sensitive information from any unsuspecting
user who had connected to it. In this scenario it would make sense that the broadcast
channel, country code, and device vendor would all be different for the rogue access
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- Garden Hotel GardenHotel Garden Hotel Free
Security Mode None None None
Channels 11 1, 11, 6 1, 11, 6
Last Joined 2013-09-10 00:27:33 2013-09-10 00:27:46 2013-09-10 08:27:43
Last AutoJoined - 2013-09-10 23:54:20 2013-09-10 23:55:16
Country - CN CN
BSSID 00:1e:2a:07:7e:ce 38:22:d6:92:17:21 58:66:ba:ee:cf:01
Device Vendor Netgear Inc Hangzhou H3C T... Hangzhou H3C T...
Table 3.2: Suspicious Network Nodes
point since the accuracy of those details is irrelevant for carrying out an attack where
the goal is to trick users into thinking they are connecting to a valid access point.
Although we were able to extract various types of information from the device, we
were never able to make any definitive conclusions about whether or not the device
was compromised, only speculations. The installation and uninstallation times for
all the applications allowed us to see whether or not an application was immediately
removed after being installed, but even if that was the case, that information alone
does not guarantee that the application was suspicious. Similarly, by looking at the
user settings that we extracted we would have been able to tell if the device became
less secure when compared to the base-model device due to changes in the user and
security settings, but we would not be able definitively conclude that it was a malware
application or some sort of malicious activity that caused the settings changes. Even
with the WiFi network information, although we were able to conclude that there
is a fair possibility that the anomalous network we observed could be the result of
a rogue access point, we do not have the evidence to ensure that claim. It seems
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that when it comes to obtaining evidence from a static image of a mobile device,
there is a lack of confidence in any claim that an investigator can make regarding the
integrity of the device due to the unknown surrounding circumstances to any single
piece of information extracted. The solution to this problem then is to diminish the
unknown elements of the surrounding circumstances so that an investigator can make
conclusions about the device with a degree of confidence, i.e. there is a low probability
that the conclusions are incorrect. Our approach seeks to accomplish exactly this by
collecting various types of information from a device and correlating them with each
other over time.
3.2 System Architecture
As previously discussed, there are two major components to our approach, those
being an on-device application and also an analysis tool on a separate server. The
purpose of the on-device application is of course to collect various types of information
from the device over time using different methods and then to send that information
to the server in the form of logs to be analyzed. The server then runs a script
which parses through the information received and separates it into in different text
files. The analysis program, which is stored on the same machine running the server,
can then be run to analyze the text files created by the server script using different
parameters specified by the user. These parameters indicate to the analysis program
which additional calculations to perform as well as which information in the text files
to perform the calculations on. This process can be seen in Figure 3.1.
3.3 On-Device Application
Because our preliminary investigation dealt with potentially compromised iOS
devices and because we already had an understanding of what information was avail-
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Figure 3.1: System Architecture
able to us, we decided to make our on-device application, which would continually
extract information about the state of the device, for the iOS platform. The inte-
grated development environment (IDE) we used to build and test our application was
Xcode version 5.1.1, and the following Frameworks were imported into our project:
XCTest.framework, SystemConfiguration.framework, AddressBookUI.framework, Ad-
dressBook.framework, MessageUI.framework, CoreGraphics.framework, UIKit.framework,
and Foundation.framework. The device we used to test our application was an iPad
Mini (1st Generation), and the machine on which we developed the application was
a Mac Pro (Early 2008) running OS X version 10.9.3.
Regarding its design, our application was only ever intended to run in the back-
ground on the device and automatically collect and send information without any
interaction from the user, so we did not develop a user interface for it; the only
interaction that the user would need to have would be to simply launch the appli-
cation like any other iOS application. The application itself is centered around a
polling mechanism with a specific time interval, meaning that our application will
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gather all the information it is designed to gather every five seconds until the ap-
plication is closed. Creating background applications, however, comes with its own
set of challenges. According to Apple’s documentation about applications running
in the background, only applications that are performing specific tasks are allowed
to run in the background of a device without being suspended, one of which is an
application that needs to update the user on the device’s location [13]; thus in order
to ensure that our application never entered a suspended sate, and therefore never
stopped gathering information, we gave it instructions to check the device’s GPS lo-
cation during each poll every five seconds. This way the application had permission
to run in the background and continue performing its functionality.
As previously mentioned, one of the primary sources of information that we want
to continuously collect using the on-device application is the device’s currently run-
ning processes. Obtaining this information lets an analyst see when, if ever, any
suspicious processes are being run on the device. We accomplished this by creating
a method in our code to extract the running processes, and we called that method
whenever it was time for the application to perform a new poll, which was every five
seconds. This method works by calling the “sysctl()” function from the “sysctl.h” C
library which is used to effectively create an array of all the running processes at that
time. We then create a dictionary object containing all the attributes of every process
we just obtained. Using this method, we are able to collect relevant attributes for
each process, such as the process start time, the process ID, and the process name.
There are also additional process attributes available to us, such as process priority
and process sleep time, but because our goal is to create a time-line of processes that
are active at the time of each poll, we only need attributes that can help us identify
a particular process, such as the first few attributes we mentioned. Once we have all
the running processes for that particular poll, we place them in a string to be sent to
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our server.
Using the on-device application to obtain the network traffic information allows
an analyst to see when, if ever, any sort of suspicious or anomalous network traffic
is occurring. Similar to how we collected the currently running processes, we collect
the current network traffic by creating a network traffic collection method and calling
that method within the poll method, which is called every five seconds. Our network
traffic collection method is a modified version of the primary function in the “inet.c”
file, which is an open source C file used by Apple in their implementation of the
netstat program. We were able to modify the code so that instead of printing out
the resulting network information to standard output, it saves the results to a string
which is then passed back in to the main program. Our modified netstat function also
only collects information pertinent to identifying and distinguishing specific network
requests, such as the protocol used, the local IP address and port, the foreign IP
address and port, and the state of the connection.
Our on-device application also continuously collects the current network access
point information to gain a perspective on when, if ever, the device had been con-
nected to an insecure or malicious network. A good example of the relevance of this
information can be seen in our preliminary investigation where the WiFi logs revealed
a potentially malicious access point. Again, in order to collect this information, we
created a method that when called would obtain details about the current network
node being accessed, and we then called this method in our poll method. This method
works by using some of the functionality of the CaptiveNetwork library available for
iOS development. Specifically, we used a method in the library called “CNCopy-
SupportInterfaces” which allowed us to get an array of all the supported network
interfaces. We then used the method “CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo” to obtain in-
formation about the current network interface from the list of supported interfaces.
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These methods gave us the SSID and BSSID of the network that the device was
currently connected to; however, by using an online IP detection API with the web
address “http://ip-api.com/line/?”, we were able to obtain the IP Address, the lati-
tude coordinate, and the longitude coordinate as well. Once we had the information
obtained from the IP detection API, we formatted it to be sent to our server.
Every time the poll method is called, all the information that was collected during
that poll is sent to the server. The way this works is that for each different data
collection method, once the data is collected, it is formatted in a certain way and
added to a global string. If for a particular poll, the current process information,
current network traffic information, and current network access point information
were all collected, the global string would then be composed of three separate sections.
Each section would contain a sequence number, which represents how many times
the poll method had been previously called at that point, and the data of one of
the collection methods, that being the current process data collection method, the
current network traffic data collection method, or the current network access point
data collection method, along with the time that the data collection method was
called. The collected information is formatted this way so that our server application
can easily parse through the data it receives and identify which information belongs
to which type of collected data and which sequence number each section of data
belongs to. A sample of how the logString contents are formatted can be seen in
Figure 3.2. The collected information is sent to the server by creating an HTTP
request object and setting the contents of that request object to be the contents of
the logString encoded as a data object. We then specify the HTTP method to be a
“POST” method and send the request to the server synchronously.
Although the on-device application can operate as described, it is not without its
share of usage limitations. One example of a usage limitation with the application is
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Figure 3.2: Sample logString contents
that sending the collected information to the server requires an internet connection,
which is not always available when using a mobile device. The problem with this is
that it is possible that an analyst would end up trying to analyze an incomplete set of
data due to some of the collected information not being sent to the server. We were
able to mitigate this issue somewhat by instructing the application to store the logs
locally if no internet connection is available; however, in order to not overload the
application memory space, we limited the application to only locally store up to one
hundred polls of information. Another instance of a usage limitation is that the most
recent information poll on the device may not necessarily be synchronized with the
data on the server since the log files of collected information may already exist on the
server when the application is launched. Once the server receives information from
the on-device application it detects the information’s sequence number and writes
that poll information to a log file. The deatails of this process will be explained in
the subsequent sections. Each log file on the server has ten instances of consecutive
poll information, meaning there would be a problem with sending information to the
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server if, for example, the application is launched and tries to send poll information
with sequence number zero (the first poll of the application) to the server, but a log
file already exists on the server that contained poll information with sequence number
zero from a previous session. The result would be that the additional sequence zero
information would be appended to that particular log file, which would cause our
analysis program to crash since it expects log files with at most ten instances of
polled information. The way we mitigate this is by telling the application to first
retrieve the most recent log file from the server and determine what the most recent
sequence number is in that log file. This way the current session will start where the
previous one left off.
3.4 Flask Server
The data collected by our on-device application is first received by our server,
which is responsible for organizing the information for analysis later. Our server uses
the Flask web application framework, specifically version 0.10.1, for handling the
various HTTP requests sent from our application, and because of this, we were able
to implement all of our instructions on handling communications from the on-device
application in a single python source file which we called “launcher.py”. According
to the Flask API documentation, once a Python file that uses the Flask web frame-
work is run, a global Flask object is created which contains instructions for how to
handle URL rules and also code for launching a local web server application, which
is activated on launch. The Flask web framework also allows us to specify URL rules
to call certain functions when receiving an HTTP request for a specific route on the
server [14]. This then allows us to perform some actions upon receiving an HTTP
request from the on-device application, which we use to organize all of our extracted
data for analysis.
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There are three primary routes used in the server’s communications with the
on-device application: “/hello”, “/startup”, and “/extraLogs”. The “/hello” route is
where the on-device application sends the requests containing the data of the collected
information from the device. The on-device application sets the request method to
“POST”, so it does not expect a response from the server, and sends the request to
the “/hello” route, which is just the base URL of the server with “/hello” appended.
Upon receiving the request at the “/hello” route, the launcher.py program converts
the data in the request to a string and writes it to a log file in the current directory.
It accomplishes this by first using a regular expression to find the sequence number
of the received data. It then appends the received data to a specific log file which it
determines by dividing the corresponding sequence number by 10 and rounding down
to the nearest whole number. The log file naming convention is the word “Output”
followed by the number it calculated by dividing the sequence number by 10 and then
the “.txt” extension. For example, if the sequence number of the received data was
“39”, it would write the received data to the file “Output3.txt”. Using this method,
every log file will have 10 consecutive instances of the data extracted from the mobile
device with no limit to the number of “Output” log files possible.
The “/startup” route is responsible for letting the on-device application know
which sequence number to start at when it is first launched. As previously mentioned,
one of the usage limitations for our on-device application is that occasionally log files
already exist on the server from a previous session, and in order to avoid writing
collected information to log files that already contain 10 sets of collected data we
need to determine the sequence number of the most recent data written to the log
files on the server. The way we accomplish this is by having the on-device application
create an HTTP request object, setting the request method to “GET”, meaning that
it will be expecting a response back from the server, and we send the request to the
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“/startup” route on the server. Upon receiving the GET request from the application,
the server creates a list of all the files in the current directory, that being the same
directory where the “luancher.py” file is located, that have the “.txt” extension by
using a regular expression. This effectively creates a list of all our current “Output”
log files. We then use another regular expression to search through each file in our
list of files and find all the sequence numbers in each file. We then take the highest
sequence number we found and set that as our return value to send back to the on-
device application. In this way, we tell the on-device application what the most recent
sequence number that the server received was.
The “/extraLogs” route is used for receiving collected information that was tem-
porarily stored locally on the device. As previously mentioned, another limitation of
the on-device application is its need for an internet connection to save the collected
information from the device. The way we handle this limitation is by having the
application store the logs locally if there is no internet connection and then send that
information to the server at a later time. This locally stored information cannot be
sent to the server through the normal “/hello” route; however, since the locally stored
information may consist of information collected over many sequences instead of just
one sequence, which is what the “/hello” route would be expecting. The on-device
application, therefore, sends the locally stored information to the “/extraLogs” route
once an internet connection is detected. Once the server receives the request on the
“/extraLogs” route it parses through the request data, which is a compilation of the
locally stored instances of collected information, and uses a regular expression to
make a list of all the line numbers from the request data that start a new sequence
number. Once the list of line numbers is made, the server program then creates a list
of sections of the input received from the on-device application based on the list of line
numbers. In other words, we just split up the original input based on where a new se-
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quence number starts, so we get a list of individual sequence instances, each one being
similar to what the on-device application would normally send to the server through
the “/hello” route. The server program then iterates though this list of sequence
instances and adds them to an “Output” log file based on the sequence number, like
it would do through the “/hello” route. In this way, data stored locally on the mobile
device is not lost and can be stored in the log files on the server normally.
3.5 Analysis Program
After the data received from the on-device application is organized into individual
log files by the server program, the data is ready to be processed by the analysis
program. The primary goal of the analysis program is to provide a way for a forensic
analyst to draw conclusions with a high level of confidence about the state of the
device, and the specific features of our analysis program that aim to achieve this goal
are what makes our approach unique when compared to the existing approaches. In
the online article “Mobile Security for a Nomadic Workforce”, the author Lee Reiber,
who oversees all mobile forensics activities for the company AccessData, talks about
the capabilities of the company’s mobile endpoint monitoring software. He states,
“It also detects unknown threats by providing visibility into network communications
and running processes, so anomalous activities can be identified and remediated” [11].
Although this technology can continuously collect information from mobile devices
to allow anomalous activities to be identified, it does not show how this information
can be used to identify anomalous activity, meaning that it does not propose a way
for an analyst to effectively use that continuously collected information.
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3.5.1 Time-Line Table
Like our server program, our analysis program consists of a single python file
named “logAnalyzer.py”, which when launched will perform a various set actions
depending on the arguments it receives. One of the primary features of this program
is constructing a table that depicts the activity of each element of data that was
collected from the on-device application over time. The first task that the program
performs upon being launched is to scan through all the “Output” log files in the
current directory and create a dictionary of all the sequences, or instances of polled
data, from the device. We do this so that all of the collected data from the “Output”
log files are easily accessible and traceable for when the program is constructing the
time-line table structure. The way it does this is by first creating a list of all the
“Output” log files, and then for each log file in that list, it creates a dictionary of
sequences, appending all the key-value pairs to the dictionary of sequences of the
previous log file. Then for each sequence in the sequence dictionary, the program
creates another dictionary containing several lists, one for each type of data collected
for that sequence. This is done by scanning through the log files line by line and
using regular expressions to determine when a particular type of collected data is
being scanned. The result is a comprehensive dictionary of all the collected data
where each key is a sequence number and each value is another dictionary in which
each key is a type of collected data and each value is a list of all the elements of that
type of collected data. This structure is shown in Figure 3.3.
The next major task that the analysis tool performs is constructing the actual
time-line table structure from the comprehensive dictionary of all of the collected
data. The design of the time-line table is that all of the sequences from a set of
collected data are represented as different columns in the table and each individual
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Figure 3.3: Comprehensive Structure Created from Output Logs
data element from each type of data is represented as its own row. This design allows
an analyst to easily compare different data elements and different sequences to one
another, allowing him or her to see if any data elements or sequences are suspiciously
similar to one another or uncharacteristically different from one another. A challenge
with this design, though, is that making a row for each data element from every
sequence would mean that there would be a lot of repeated rows in the final time-
line table structure, since a lot of data elements persist over several sequences. The
solution to this is to systematically make a list of all the unique elements to use
for creating the rows in the time-line table; however, because the data elements are
further separated into different lists based on the type of data in our comprehensive
dictionary, we can first create lists of unique data elements based on the different
types of data, which would allow the analyst to filter the time-line data structure
based on data type (discussed further in subsection 3.5.4). We can then append these
lists of unique elements together to produce a single list of every unique element
across all types of collected data for the session that the on-device application was
running. This process can be seen in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Creating Lists of Unique Elements from Monitoring Session
Once we have a list of all the unique data elements we can begin to fill in the
cells in the table. Each cell that is not the first cell in a row or a column represents
whether or the data element at the beginning of the row it is in is active during the
sequence at the beginning of the column its in. To fill in the cells, we simply check to
see which sequence and data element a particular cell correlates to and then check the
comprehensive dictionary structure to see if that particular data element is present
in the list of elements for that sequence. If it is, then we write a “1” in that cell
representing that that data element was active; otherwise, we write a “0”.
Regarding the actual table that the “logAnalyzer.py” program outputs, the first
row of the time-line table is the header row, and it is simply the different sequences and
their respective time-stamps taken from the Output log files. Once we have a list of
all the unique data elements we can begin to fill in the cells in the table. Each cell that
is not the first cell in a row or a column represents whether or not the data element
at the beginning of the row its in is active during the sequence at the beginning of
the column its in. To fill in the cells, we simply check to see which sequence and data
element a particular cell correlates to and then check the comprehensive dictionary
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structure to see if that particular data element is present in the list of elements for
that sequence. If it is, then we write a “1” in that cell representing that that data
element was active; otherwise, we write a “0”. Fully copying each unique element as
the first item in each row of our table, however, is not feasible since each element is
too large in terms of character length to conveniently fit into a single cell of our time-
line table. As a result we pick out the most identifying attributes of each type of data
so that we can abbreviate what is actually being represented as the first item in each
row of our table. For the process data type we use the process name; for the network
traffic data type, we use the traffic’s foreign address; and for the network access point
data type, we use the BSSID. Abbreviating data like this causes a loss of information
available to the analyst when looking at the time-line; however, because we include
key identifiers for each element, the lost information can be easily looked-up in the
“Output” log files. Additionally, an analyst is still able to use the time-line table to
effectively draw conclusions, since abbreviating the information in the table has no
impact on an analysts ability to relate different types of information to each other or
identify certain elements of information as being anomalous. As an example, Figure
3.5 shows how obtained network traffic information found in the “Output” log files
is abbreviated when placed in our Time-line Table.
As previously mentioned, the purpose of creating a system that allows for continu-
ous collection of information from a mobile device is to provide an analyst with a more
complete story of the events that occurred, allowing him or her to make conclusions
with a higher level of confidence than those that could be made from a commercially
available forensics tool alone. For example, say that the on-device monitoring ap-
plication is able to collect 2 different types of information from the device, process
information and network traffic information, over a period of sixty seconds. If a poll
occurs every 5 seconds, then there would be 12 polls, which in our analysis program
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Figure 3.5: Abbreviating Data from the Log Files for the Time-Line Table
would be represented as sequences 0 through 11. Suppose that the analyst uses the
analysis tool to produce the time-line table output similar to that seen in Table 3.3
and notices that Process C is active only at sequence 9 and that at sequences 10 and
11 there is network traffic between the device and a server located in a foreign country.
The analyst would likely determine that there is a high probability that the process
observed in sequence 9 is malicious since it is anomalous and occurs directly before
the suspicious communications observed in the following sequences. In this case the
analyst is essentially able to determine more unknown factors about the events that
occurred on the device by looking at data collected over a period time as opposed
to using a commercial forensics tool that looks at a static image of the device, thus
allowing for a more complete analysis. In the case of a static image, if an analyst
were to obtain an image of the device through a commercially available tool, he or
she might know that the process in question was launched at some point and that the
network communications to the foreign servers occurred, but it would be unknown
how those events related to each other, leaving the analyst with little information to
make a conclusion. Perhaps the analyst would be able to find log files showing start
times of process and network activity on the static image of the device, but log files
32
Sequence S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11
Process A 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Process B 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Process C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Local Address 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Foreign Address 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table 3.3: Sample Time-line Table
typically do not give any insight as to the length of time that an event persists as
seen in the WiFi access point logs in our preliminary investigation.
Naturally, the works related to our thesis also propose mechanisms for continu-
ously collecting data in order for analysts to make conclusions with greater confidence,
but by creating a time-line table, our approach provides a way for the analyst to use
that collected information effectively, unlike the related works. In the hypothetical
situation given, an analyst is able to use our time-line table structure to quickly iden-
tify that a process is anomalous, since only one sequence in the table shows that
process, and also that there is a high probability that the process is related to the
suspicious network activity, since the process is active only directly before the suspi-
cious network activity. Essentially, our analysis program organizes the continuously
collected information by using our time-line table structure to improve the forensic
process.
3.5.2 Levenshtein Distance Calculation
Although our time-line data structure is a good example of a way to use the
continuously collected information to improve a forensic analysis, it is not the only
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improvement that we can make. In addition to organizing the collected data, we
can also perform various calculations on the data to highlight for the analyst which
parts of the data should be investigated thoroughly, thus improving the efficiency of
a forensic analysis. One way to do this is by calculating the Levenshtein distance
for each row in the time-line table. Levensthein distance describes the number of
changes that need to be made between two sequences of elements in order to make
them the same, and it has been shown to be useful in the field of computer forensics
by reducing the data to be searched through. Mangnes discusses this technique in
[15]. In the paper, Mangnes mentions how when searching for a specific piece of data
within a forensically obtained set of data, the data can be split up into a number of
data buffers and then searched through using a Levenshtein distance calculation. The
calculation would compare the piece of data that is of interest and any one of the data
buffers and return a Levenshtein distance value. The data buffer that corresponds
with the lowest Levenshtein distance value would be most likely to contain the piece
of data being searched for and then a more precise search can be performed on that
specific data buffer to find its exact location.
Similar to the approach in the paper by Mangnes, our approach uses Levenshtein
distance calculations to find similarities between sets of data. The difference, though,
is that instead of using Levenshtein distance to search for specific data, our approach
uses the calculation to find correlations among different pieces of evidence, which if
investigated further, may allow an analyst to quickly arrive at a conclusion about the
state of the mobile device. For example, If two rows in our table have a very small
Levenshtein distance over a large number of poll sequences, then it is very likely
that those two rows are related to each other, and if the analyst determines that
the evidence represented in those rows are typically not related to each other, then
that evidence potentially represents malicious activity. In this way the Levenshtein
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distance can highlight an area that should be further investigated.
For example, assume an analyst has a set of monitored data collected from a
mobile device which shows several processes and several instances of current network
traffic across 50 poll sequences. The analyst calculates the Levenshtein distance
for each data element, comparing each element to every other element in the set.
Once the calculation is complete, if the analyst notices that two seemingly unrelated
data elements, an unrecognized process and a network traffic instance showing a
connection to a foreign address, have a Levenshtein distance of 0, then the analyst
would determine that there is a suspicious relationship between those data and likely
investigate them further. In short, low Levenshtein distance values between elements
in a data set often indicate some sort of relationship, which can occasionally be
malicious if the analyst can determine that the elements are not typically related.
Our “logAnalyzer.py” program includes functionality to calculate the Levenshtein
distances for our data. For the calculation, we use the “Levenshtein” Python library
which contains a comparison function that can calculate the Levenshtein distance
between two strings. To perform the calculation we essentially format each row in
our time-line table into a single string object of 1’s and 0’s representing when the
element for that row was active or inactive. We then place all of these strings in a list
and loop through that list, performing the Levenshtein distance comparison on every
other element in the list for each element in the list. The results are then stored in
a table with both the columns and the rows being the list of all the elements in our
extracted data set. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.6; note that in the Resulting
Data table the values on the diagonal are not included since any element string will
have a Levenshtein distance of “0” when compared to itself.
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Figure 3.6: Levenshtein Distance Calculation
3.5.3 Euclidean Distance Nearest Neighbor Calculation
The other calculation that our “LogAnalyzer.py” program is capable of performing
on our data to highlight areas of interest for an analyst is a Euclidean distance
calculation. Euclidean distance is the mathematical term for the distance between
two points in Euclidean space, and is the metric used in calculating the k-th nearest
neighbor as decribed in the paper by Ramaswamy et al [16]. In this paper, the
authors use the Euclidean distance calculation to find any outliers in a set of data
points. The way they do this is by first determining a threshold number of points,
n, of the total points in the data set that would be considered outliers. Then by
calculating the Euclidean distance from each point to every other point in the set,
the authors determine the distance of the k-th nearest neighbor for each point in
the set. If for a particular point there are no more than n - 1 other points that
have a higher k-th nearest neighbor value, then that point is considered an outlier
of the data set. In another paper by Lazarevic et al. the authors demonstrate how
various outlier detection schemes can be used in anomaly detection. One such outlier
detection scheme was a modification of the k-th nearest neighbor outlier detection
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Figure 3.7: Nearest Neighbor Anomaly Detection
scheme described in the previously mentioned paper. The modification consists of
replacing the previously described threshold number of points in a data set, used to
determine the outlier points, with a numerical threshold value. Any point that has
a k-th nearest neighbor distance greater than the threshold value is considered an
outlier [17]. The authors tested the effectiveness of this outlier detection scheme,
among other schemes, as an anomaly detection scheme by seeing what percentage of
anomalies in the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data set it was able to
detect. According to the resulting data, this particular anomaly detection scheme was
able to detect a higher percentage of anomalies associated with the network attacks
than any other anomaly detection method described in the paper. Figure 3.7 shows
how the nearest neighbor calculation can be used in anomaly detection.
An assumption one could make about malicious activity is that it tends to happen
significantly less frequently than non-malicious activity. This assumption is supported
in [18]. In the paper, the authors discuss how alerts from an intrusion detection system
can be prioritized and grouped based off anomalous behavior. They carry out attacks
on a test system and use their own tool to group intrusion detection alerts based off of
how anomalous they are, giving higher priority to the alerts that are more anomalous.
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When analyzing the higher priority alerts, they found that the true positive rate was
100 percent, meaning that no suspicious or malicious behavior was left out of the high-
priority grouping of the alerts, which implies that anomalousness is in fact a property
of malicious activity. Because of this property we decided to use Euclidean distance
k-th nearest neighbor calculations to find anomalous, and therefore suspicious, data
in our data sets, similar to how the modified k-th nearest neighbor outlier detection
scheme was used in the paper by Lazarevic et al. In order to calculate the nearest
neighbor Euclidean distances on a data set we receive from the on-device application,
we first need to specify what defines a data point within our data. The data points
that we use in our Euclidean distance calculations are essentially the different columns
from our time-line table structure where each value in a column, either a “1” or “0”,
represents a value for a different dimension in Euclidean space. This means that
if, for instance, there were a data set consisting of m data elements across n poll
sequences and we want to find the k nearest neighbors for each point, then we would
be performing Euclidean distance calculations between sets of 2 of n points across m
dimensions and keeping the lowest k distances for each of the n points . Once we have
our k nearest neighbors for each point, we create a new table to host those results, in
which there are k + 1 columns, which list the k nearest neighbors for each of the n +
1 rows, which represent each of the poll sequences. This resulting Euclidean distances
formed from a data set represented in a sample time-line table can be seen in Figure
3.8.
Naturally a concern that arises from this type of calculation is that if we have
an arbitrarily large number of dimensions across which we are trying to calculate
Euclidean distances for every point in our data set, then the calculations may become
computationally impossible - also known as the curse of dimensionality. To solve this
problem we employed the use of a ball-tree data structure to organize our data points
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Figure 3.8: K Nearest Neighbor Distance Calculation
and calculate the k-nearest neighbors for each point in a computationally feasible
amount of time. The ball-tree data structure is a type of binary tree where each node
defines a hypersphere with half of the dimensions of its parent’s hypershphere - its
sibling node defines a hypersphere with the other half of its parent’s hypersphere’s
dimensions. Each node also contains all of the points whose distance is closer to its
centroid than the centroid of its siblings hypersphere [19]. A ball-tree data structure,
therefore, has a special property in that for any point, p, in a ball tree, the distance
between p and another point in the tree will always be greater than or equal to the
distance between p and the centroid of any hypersphere containing that point [20].
What this means is that when searching for the point in our set of data closest to a
point, p, any subtree and all the points therein that are further away from the closest
point we have observed so far, which is easily discernable due to the organization
of the data structure, can be ignored for the rest of the search. Continuing the
search, we can keep track of whatever point is currently closest to point, p, and
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Figure 3.9: Nearest Neighbor Calculation Using Ball-Tree Data Structure
whenever a new closest point is found, we can discard the old closest point as well as
any points within subtrees further away from the new closest point. Eventually we
will discover the nearest neighbor to point p without having to have calculated the
Euclidean distance from p to every other point across an arbitrarily large number of
dimensions. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.9
Figure 3.9 shows a snapshot of a search for the nearest neighbor to point P in
a data set. In the figure we can see that point P shares a parent hypersphere with
the current closest point, point Q. When attempting to calculate if another point,
for example Point R, is closer to point P than point Q, we can simply check where
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the hyperspheres that contain the points are located in the ball-tree data structure.
Because it takes more hops to get from hypersphere A to hypersphere C than it
does from hypersphere A to hypersphere B, we know that point Q is closer to point
P than point R is. The computational complexity arises, however, when trying to
calculate which hyperspheres contain point R since there are an arbitrary number of
dimensions. Fortunately, because we only care about whether or not point R is closer
to point P than point Q, we can stop trying to locate point R’s location in the tree as
soon as we see that one of its ancestor’s hyperspheres is farther away to hypersphere
A than hypersphere B is, saving a considerable amount of computation.
To demonstrate how discovering anomalies by calculating the k nearest neighbors
from a data set can aid in a forensic investigation, we consider a scenario in which
a data set contains over 200 data elements across more than 500 poll sequences. In
this data set there are records of the mobile device connecting to a malicious WiFi
access point as well as several web addresses that were only communicated with while
connected to the malicious network, but other than these events, the activity on the
device is generally constant. This means that in an investigation an analyst could
potentially determine, by looking at the time-line table, that the sequences describ-
ing connections to those specific web addresses while on that particular network are
anomalous and therefore somewhat suspicious, but because the data set is somewhat
extensive, it is unlikely that the analyst would be able to detect the anomalous se-
quences. Using Euclidean distance calculations, however, an analyst can gain an
understanding of how different each sequence is from the other sequences, and be-
cause the sequences that show the connections to the specific web addresses while
connected to a malicious network are uncommon among the entire set of sequences,
they would show an abnormally high k-th nearest neighbor value. For example, if
there are four sequences that show the connections to specific web addresses while
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Figure 3.10: K Nearest Neighbor Euclidean Distance Anomaly Example
connected to the malicious network, then the fourth nearest neighbor distance value
for those sequences would be abnormally high when compared to the fourth nearest
neighbor distances of all the other sequences. In this way an analyst could deter-
mine more easily that those sequences are anomalous which could lead to him or her
discovering the connection to the malicious network. This scenario is illustrated in
figure 3.10. In the figure, the outlier points, which represent the four sequences in
which a connection to the malicious network was made, clearly are anomalous when
compared to the normal data points, but if we were to only look at the first three
nearest neighbors for each point, then they would not appear anomalous or suspi-
cious. The lines connecting the outlier points to the normal data points, however,
represent the fourth nearest neighbor distances for the outlier points, which are much
more evidently anomalous compared to the fourth nearest neighbor distances of any
other point.
Although the time-line table structure, Levenshtein distance calculations, and
Euclidean distance calculations in our approach are all effective ways in which the
continuously collected information can be used to aid an analyst in an investigation,
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calculating the Euclidean distance to find the k nearest neighbors for each sequence is
somewhat unique in that it helps to identify how anomalous something is, which is a
property often associated with malicious activity, as opposed to calculating the Leven-
shtein distance which only points out correlations among the data elements and relies
on the analyst’s intuition to draw meaningful conclusions. As previously mentioned,
works related to our approach have drawn attention to the idea that by continuously
collecting information from a mobile device, it is possible to perform some form of
anomaly detection which would help an analyst identify malicious activity, but those
works never actually proposed how this can be accomplished. This feature of our
approach, therefore, offers meaningful contribution to the area of mobile forensics,
since we are specifically exploring effective ways in which the continuously collected
information can be used to improve a forensic analysis.
3.5.4 Additional Features
Another one of the major features of our “logAnalyzer.py” program is that it
can take in several command-line arguments that allow the user to manipulate the
different outputs of the program in various ways. For the time-line table, there are
two parameters “-S (–sequences)” and “-R (–rows)” that allow the user to specify
which sequences and rows are displayed in the time-line table, respectively. This
means that if an analyst has already determined that a specific set of sequences and
rows to be of interest in an investigation, he or she can specifically view that data
in order to more efficiently continue on with the investigation and draw conclusions.
Additionally, the user is able to filter the data that gets displayed in the time-line table
by the data type. There are three parameters “-P (–processes)”, “-A (–addresses)”,
and “-N (–networks)” that allows the user to only view specific types of data in the
resulting time-line table, and similar to the row and columns filtering parameters,
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these parameters are useful in that they can allow an analyst to more efficiently
arrive at a conclusion by limiting the data to be analyzed.
The Levenshtein distance calculation output table also has its own command-line
input parameter which is “-L (–levenshtein),” but instead of filtering the data that is
displayed in the table, the argument highlights certain cells within the Levenshtein
output table. This argument takes in a numerical value which all levenshtein distances
in the table are compared to. If any Levenshtein distance is less than or equal to the
argument’s value, then two asterisk characters are appended to the number in the
table. This allows an analyst to specify the maximum Levenshtein distance value
that would be of interest in the investigation and then easily see which entries in
the Levenshtein distance output table are below that specified value. Essentially
this parameter makes it easier for an analyst to identify data elements that have a
strong correlation with one another, and are therefore of interest, which improves the
efficiency of the analysis.
Like the other output tables, the k nearest neighbors output table also has a
corresponding input argument which is “-E (–euclidean)”, and it takes in a numerical
value which specifies how many nearest neighbors will be calculated and displayed for
the sequences in the output table. Naturally we need to allow an analyst to specify
how many nearest neighbor distances should be calculated for the sequences so that if
there are multiple anomalous sequences in a data set, like in the example previously
described, the analyst will be able to determine how many anomalous sequences there
are. Unlike the other input arguments, however, this argument does not improve the
efficiency of the forensic analysis as it does not filter out unimportant data or highlight
data of interest. Our program does, however, implement a highlighting mechanism
specific to the k nearest neighbor calculation. In order to ensure that a forensic analyst
is able to efficiently identify any anomalous sequences in the k nearest neighbor output
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table, we calculate both the average and the standard deviation for each of the nearest
neighbors 0 through k across every sequence. To calculate the standard deviation for
any one of the nearest neighbors 0 through k, we use the formula:
σ =
√∑n
i=1 (xi − x¯)2
n− 1
In the formula σ is the resulting standard deviation, xi is a single data value, x¯
is the mean of all the data values, and n is the number of data points. For every
sequence in the output table we compare the value of each nearest neighbor 0 through
k to the average value of that nearest neighbor. If the nearest neighbor distance
value for that sequence is greater than the average value for that nearest neighbor
by at least the value of the standard deviation, we append two asterisk characters
to the end of the value in that cell, specifying that for that sequence, that nearest
neighbor distance value is outside of standard deviation and is therefore suspicious.
Additionally because the k nearest neighbor distance metric is unique in that it can
be used to identify a property that is often associated with malicious activity, as
previously described, we also append an asterisk to every cell in the time-line table
that belongs to a data element (a row) that is active at some point in the table during
a sequence that was shown to have a k nearest neighbor distance value outside of
standard deviation. Figure 3.11 uses an example set of data to illustrate this process
further. Due to these modifications to the k nearest neighbor and time-line output
tables, we are effectively highlighting any pertinent information in those tables which
in turn can improve the efficiency of the forensic analysis.
After determining the nearest neighbor distance values that are outside of stan-
dard deviation, we can use a similar process to calculate anomalous data elements in
the time-line table structure. We first get a list of all the sequences in the Euclidean
distance nearest neighbors results table that contain at least one nearest neighbor
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Figure 3.11: Highlighting Anomalous Nearest Neighbor Distances
distance value outside of standard deviation, in other words, a list of the sequences
that have at least one value followed by asterisks. We again calculate standard de-
viation and average values, but this time we calculate those values for each row in
the time-line table structure. If any call for any row of the time-line table structure
contains a value that is outside of standard deviation and that cell also is within the
column of a sequence that is in the list of anomalous sequences from the euclidean
distance nearest neighbors results table, then that row in the time-line table structure
containing that cell has two asterisks appended to each of its cells. In this way, we
can highlight every data element in the time-line table structure that is related to the
anomalous sequences, since during those sequences, those particular data elements
also had abnormal values.
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Chapter 4
EVALUATION
The goal of our approach is twofold: First, it is to demonstrate that by continuously
collecting information, an analyst can perform a more accurate assessment of a mo-
bile device, and second, we show how specific methods can be used to interpret the
collected information to form meaningful conclusions. The first part of our goal is
achieved by demonstrating the discrepancies between the information collected from
a commercial forensics tool and the information we were able to gather using our on-
device application. In regards to the second part of our goal, although we can explain
our process for interpreting the collected data to form more meaningful conclusions,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach using actual data gives it credibil-
ity and helps solidify our claims; therefore, we simulated a network-based attack on
an iOS device similar to the “evil twin” attack previously mentioned in the Related
Works section. Our simulated attack is similar in the sense that it involves creating
a malicious access point with an SSID that resembles that of a non-malicious one.
Whenever an iOS device connects to the malicious access point and tries to access a
site hosted on a specific server, the request is forwarded to another malicious server
which hosts a malicious site without the user knowing. An applicable real world sce-
nario for this attack, for example, would be if an attacker set up a malicious access
point with a similar SSID as a non-malicious access point in a public location, such
as an airport or a coffee shop. The attacker could then host a server on his or her own
personal computer that mimics a site where a user would enter sensitive information,
like a banking site. The attacker could then manipulate DNS settings to instruct the
malicious access point to forward all requests meant for the legitimate banking site
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Figure 4.1: Attack Simulation Topology
to the fake banking site on his or her personal server where a user may then unsus-
pectingly enter sensitive information, such as log-in credentials. This would allow the
attacker to then impersonate the user on the legitimate banking web site and cause
harm.
4.1 Setup
There were several components needed to simulate the described attack; the main
ones include two Linux virtual machines, each running Ubuntu version 12.04 and
hosting both a web server and a DNS server; two wireless routers, a Rosewill RNX-
N150RT wireless-N router and a Medialink MWN-WAPR150N wireless-N router; and
an iOS device running our on-device application. In our setup the iOS device can
connect to each of the wireless routers, which are connected to their own respective
virtual machines hosting both a web server and a DNS server. A topographical
diagram of our network setup can be seen in Figure 4.1.
In addition to setting up the components of our network in a specific way, we
also needed to install specific software so that we could host a web server and a DNS
server on each of the virtual machines. One program that we installed on both of our
virtual machines is the Bind9 Domain Name System software. The Bind9 software
allows us to set up our own domain name system and specify which domains resolve to
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certain IP addresses by creating individual zone files referenced in the “named.conf”
configuration file. We also installed the Apache2 web server software on both virtual
machines in order to host web servers. After installing Apache2 we also created
slightly different html pages for each web server which are served upon accessing the
server. Once the DNS servers were set up on both virtual machines we needed to
modify some of the settings on the routers. We set one of the routers to have the
SSID “GoodInternet” and the other the SSID “Good1nternet” to portray a scenario
in which a user connects to a malicious wireless access point attempting to mimic
one that is not malicious. We also configured each wireless router to look to the
DNS servers on their respective virtual machines as the primary DNS servers which
we accomplished by specifying the address of the primary DNS server in the router
settings. Once set up, the router will try to resolve the domain name of any request it
receives by looking at the router’s primary DNS server, which is the DNS server being
hosted on the router’s corresponding virtual machine. Once the router receives back
from its DNS server the address that corresponds to the requested domain name, it
passes the request on to the web server with that address, which incidentally is on
the same virtual machine as the DNS server. The web server responds with its html
page which then is sent back to the iOS device. This process is illustrated further in
Figure 4.2.
4.2 Procedure
Simulating the attack after the setup is complete is a fairly involved process and
requires some precision in its execution. The following is the procedure we followed
in executing the attack simulation:
1. Run the “launcher.py” python program on the remote server.
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Figure 4.2: Request Path Traversal
2. Connect one of the virtual machines to the router with the SSID “GoodInternet”
and the other virtual machine to the router with the SSID “Good1nternet.”
3. On each virtual machine launch both the Apache2 Web Server and Bind9 DNS
services.
4. Connect the iOS Device to the router with the SSID “GoodInternet.”
5. Launch the on-device monitoring application on the iOS device.
6. Back out of the on-device monitoring application, leaving it to run in the back-
ground, and launch a web browser on the iOS device. In the browser navigate
to the domain “www.good.site”.
7. Refresh the page 2 to 3 more times, waiting a few seconds before each refresh.
8. Close the browser and in the Device settings on the iOS device, turn off the
device’s WiFi capability.
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9. Repeat steps 6 - 8 two more times.
10. Now connect the iOS device to the router with the SSID “Good1nternet.”
11. Launch a web browser on the device and navigate to “www.good.site”.
12. Close the browser and in the device settings on the iOS device, turn off the
device’s WiFi capability.
13. Reconnect the iOS device to the router with the SSID “GoodInternet” and
repeat steps 6 - 8 two more times.
14. Close the browser and in the device settings, connect to a WiFi access point
with an internet connection to send all the logged data to the remote server.
Starting off, we run the “launcher.py” program to ensure that any data collected
from the on-device application can be successfully received on our remote server. We
then connect to the “GoodInternet” access point to try to simulate browsing on a
normal, non-malicious network. In order to populate our data set with mostly non-
malicious data, we disconnect from the non-malicious router and rejoin multiple times
before connecting to the malicious router. Once we connect to the malicious router,
we launch a web browser only once and navigate to what the user would think is the
same web-page. We then immediately disconnect from that network and rejoin the
non-malicious network. This will ensure that the malicious network does not appear
as frequently in our resulting data as the non-malicious network, simulating how non-
malicious networks are more common than malicious ones. At the end we connect
to a network with an internet connection so the on-device application can send the
collected information to our remote server.
To simulate a user unknowingly accessing a malicious web site, we created simple
HTML pages that are returned for requests to both the malicious and non-malicious
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Figure 4.3: Attack Simulation web pages
web servers. The pages are similar to each other in appearance but have slightly
different text so that we could differentiate between them during the experiment.
The benign and malicious web servers’ HTML pages can be seen in Figure 4.3.
4.3 Results
Simulating the malicious router attack resulted in a data set that had 97 poll
sequences spread over 10 different “Output” log files. We used our “logAnalyzer.py”
program to sift through the data set and to demonstrate what kind of conclusions
an analyst could potentially draw by using our analysis program on a data set of
continuously collected information. Running our analysis program on the data with-
out any input arguments resulted in the program outputting the data in a time-line
table structure in which we could see during which sequence specific data elements
were active. Assuming that an analyst looking at this data set would have no prior
knowledge of the attack that was simulated, we attempt to replicate the steps that
he or she could take to draw accurate conclusions about the malicious activity.
Without knowledge of which pieces of information in the resulting data set are
pertinent, an analyst could start the analysis by first looking at the time-line data
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Figure 4.4: Attack Simulation Time-line Table Layout
structure, which would give him or her an unfiltered summary of all the data elements
across every sequence in the monitoring session, showing which data elements were
active at specific times. The time-line table of the data set for the simulated attack
shows 111 data elements (rows) across 97 sequences (columns); however of those
sequences, only the first 84 of them are actually relevant to the investigation since
the last 13 occurred when the collected data was being sent to our remote server. Of
the data elements, 83 of them describe the processes that were running on the mobile
device during the monitoring session; 24 of them describe the foreign addresses of all
the connections that were active during the monitoring session, and the remaining 4
data elements show the BSSIDs of the different network entries. This layout can be
seen in Figure 4.4.
Because the time-line table structure is somewhat extensive it would be difficult for
an analyst to determine that the device had connected to a malicious network only by
looking at it. The next logical step would be for the analyst to try to figure out which
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data elements are more interesting or suspicious than others, and this can be done by
figuring out which data elements in the table correspond to any anomalous activities.
To do this an analyst could modify the input arguments of the “logAnalyzer.py”
program so that it also displays the Euclidean distance nearest neighbors result table
for the k nearest neighbors, which in this case we will say is 5. Looking at the
Euclidean distance nearest neighbors results table, the analyst would see several cells
with asterisks appended to the distance values indicating that those sequences have
anomalous distance values for that nearest neighbor. However, the cells containing
anomalous distance values are fairly prevalent and spread throughout the table, so
the table does not reveal any particular sequence to be terribly suspicious compared
to the others. It is interesting to note, though, that with this data set, although the
cells with the asterisks appended are prevalent throughout the table, several of those
highlighted distances have a value of 0. The fact that the distances with a value of 0
are highlighted means that the average distance between sequences is larger than 0,
but not necessarily that these sequences are suspicious. In fact, it means the opposite,
since there would be at least k other sequences that are identical to the sequence in
question. In contrast, a cell that is highlighted for having a Euclidean distance nearest
neighbor value that is abnormally high would be suspicious since it would indicate
that the sequence in question is not similar to any other sequence. Figure 4.5 is a
screen shot of a segment of the Euclidean distance nearest neighbor output table,
showing how some of the highlighted values are 0 and others are closer to 2.
An analyst may not be able to make any conclusions regarding anomalous activity
by strictly looking at the Euclidean distance nearest neighbors result table since there
are a lot of highlighted cells that are not actually indicative of anomalies. The analyst
could, however, look at the Levenshtein distance result table to see if there are any
correlations among the data elements by including the appropriate input argument
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Figure 4.5: Unfiltered Euclidean Distance Table Segment
when running the “logAnalyzer.py” program. The Levenshtein distance argument
expects an integer value which the program uses as a maximum value for suspicious
distances in the resulting table - highlighting with asterisks any values less than
or equal to it. The resulting Levenshtein distance table for this data set shows a
large number of highlighted cells, the vast majority of which are processes being
compared with other processes. Furthermore, almost every process listed in the table
has a Levenshtein distance value of 0 when compared to almost any other process.
This means that almost all the processes are active and inactive at the exact same
times across every sequence. An analyst could verify this by looking back at the
time-line table structure and seeing that almost all the processes are in fact active
across the entire data set. Because the active processes do not drastically change, the
analyst could disregard them for the remainder of the analysis, specifying in the input
arguments of the “logAnalyzer.py” program that only the network traffic information
and network access point information should be considered.
Once the program is run again with the process information filtered out, the
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Figure 4.6: Filtered Euclidean Distance Table Segment
program displays a new time-line table, Euclidean distance nearest neighbors table,
and Levenstein distance result table without any process information. This changes
the Euclidean distance result table so that sequences that have a nearest neighbor
value of 0 are no longer highlighted as being anomalous. The result is that now only
a few sequences in the table have highlighted cells: sequence 15, sequence 41, and
sequences 51 - 56; however, of these sequences, only sequences 52 had a highlighted
cell for the nearest two neighbors, whereas all the other sequences that had highlighted
cells only had them highlighted for their 3rd, 4th, and 5th nearest neighbors. What
this means is that sequence 52 is more anomalous than any other sequence in the data
set, since even the distances of the sequences closest to it were outside of standard
deviation. These anomalies from the filtered data can be seen in Figure 4.6.
Knowing that sequence 52 is an anomalous sequence, an analyst would then be able
to look back at the time-line table structure to investigate which data elements were
active during sequence 52 and what that activity implies. As previously explained,
the time-line table highlights any data elements (rows) that has an anomalous value
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outside of standard deviation within any sequence that was determined to be anoma-
lous in the Euclidean distance nearest neighbor result table. This means that an
analyst could figure out which data elements are most suspicious within a sequence
that was identified to be suspicious and then trace those elements through the time-
line table to try to find any evidence of suspicious activity. In looking at the time-line
table from our attack simulation with the processes filtered out, we see that four
data elements have been highlighted: the foreign address “www.good.site.http”, the
network with BSSID “68:1c:a2:0:8c:d0,” the newtork with no BSSID which instead
says “NoConnection”, and the network with BSSID “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0”. Starting off,
an analyst might look at the network with BSSID “68:1c:a2:0:8c:d0” since it is the
data element that is first active among the four highlighted data elements. This
network connection is active from sequence 0 through sequence 14. It then becomes
inactive from sequence 15 through sequence 27 and then active again from sequence
28 through sequence 40, inactive again from sequence 41 through 62, and then active
again from sequence 63 through sequence 83. Because our tool labels having no WiFi
network connection as a type of network connection, whenever the network connec-
tion with BSSID “68:1c:a2:0:8c:d0” is inactive, another network connection is active.
In particular, the network connection with BSSID “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0” is active from
sequence 52 through sequence 55. The activity of the different WiFi networks can be
seen in Figure 4.7.
These sequences also happen to be the sequences that were highlighted in the eu-
clidean distance nearest neighbor result table, which could lead an analyst to conclude
that this particular network connection is more suspicious than the others. Looking
for any other activity that corresponds to this network, an analyst may notice that
one of the other highlighted data elements, the foreign address “www.good.site.http,”
is only active in sequence 52 which is within our series of anomalous sequences. The
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Figure 4.7: Attack Simulation WiFi Network Activity
fact that communication with a specific foreign address is the only network communi-
cation esatblished while on the network with the BSSID of “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0” is not
necessarily incriminating for that WiFi network. What is incriminating, though, is
the fact that the foreign address “www.good.site.http” was not active on any other
networks or at any other place in the data set. This means that there is a strong pos-
sibility that that foreign address “www.good.site.http” is somehow connected to the
network with BSSID “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0.” This is evidenced further by the Levenshtein
distance result table which shows that the two data elements have a Levensthein dis-
tance of only 4. The data set does show that other foreign addresses are exclusive
to certain WiFi networks, such as the address “192.168.1.132.http” only appearing
on the network with BSSID “68:1c:a2:0:8c:d0,” but the difference is that that for-
eign address appears on that network multiple times, and the network itself is active
throughout the data set, making it non-anomalous.
Seeing that the WiFi network with BSSID “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0” and the foreign ad-
dress “www.good.site.http” are both anomalous and related, an analyst could then
look at the actual log files themselves to see if any more information about these
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Figure 4.8: Excerpt from Log Files
data elements can be obtained. Knowing that the anomalous behavior occurs around
sequence 52, an analyst can easily locate the pertinent information in the log files
and find that the SSID of the WiFi network with the BSSID “14:35:8b:8:4b:a0” is
“Good1nternet”, and, in earlier log files, that the SSID of the WiFi network with
the BSSID “68:1c:a2:0:8c:d0” is “GoodInternet”. The analyst would notice that the
SSID’s of the two networks only differ by one character and that because the SSID of
the anomalous WiFi network has the less conventional spelling of the same phrase,
there is a good chance that it is attempting to mimic the non-anomalous network.
Figure 4.8 shows an excerpt from the log files obtained through the attack simu-
lation, highlighting the different SSIDs between a non-anomalous sequence and an
anomalous one. Taking into consideration that there is a connection to a statistically
anomalous foreign address on a statistically anomalous WiFi network that has an
SSID suspiciously similar to a non-anomalous one, an analyst could conclude that
there is a high probability that the device had connected to a malicious network.
Because we had a data set of continually collected information from the device,
we showed how an analyst could use the “logAnalyzer.py” program to step through
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the data set and eventually conclude that the device had connected to a malicious
network. As we saw in our preliminary investigation, it is not possible to make that
conclusion with the same level of confidence using a commercial forensics tool that can
only get a static image of the device since, as previously mentioned, the information
we had was somewhat limited. In the case of our preliminary investigation, we could
see that one WiFi network adapter had an SSID that was similar to the other networks
while having a different network adapter vendor and country code. The reason that
this information is somewhat limited is because all of these details help describe the
same idea, which is that the device had connected to multiple network adapters and
one of them was suspiciously different from the others. In our simulated attack, an
analyst could find similar information describing the same idea, that being that the
SSID of one of the routers is suspiciously only slightly different than the SSID of the
other router, but he or she could also find other information not directly related to
that idea, which would expand the analyst’s overall perspective, providing additional
insight into determining what malicious events may have transpired. For instance,
using the on-device application and the “logAnalyzer.py” program, we showed how
an analyst could determine that in our attack simulation one of the routers was
anomalous and also related to a connection to a web address that was anomalous.
This is not to say, however, that the data collected from the commercial tool is not
useful. It is important to note that although the on-device application was also able
to collect information which led to investigating the idea that one of the network
access points has some suspicious differences in addition to other ideas, it did not
offer the same level of detail as the commercial forensics tool. The most accurate
analysis, therefore, would take advantage of the detailed information that can be
obtained from a commercial tool as well as the information about the device over
time that comes from our on-device application.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
In our approach we show that continuously collecting information from a mobile
device can significantly help a forensic analyst in an investigation; furthermore, we
also show precisely how this data collection helps by simulating an attack on a mobile
device and by using our analysis program to reason to an accurate conclusion. Our
approach, though, is not without limitations, one of the most important of which is
that our approach is only a proof of concept and not necessarily practically beneficial
for a forensic analyst. The simulated attack that we created was designed to parallel
a real-world scenario in the sense that the majority of the events in the data-set
were non-malicious and a few anomalous events were malicious. An actual network-
based attack carried out on an iOS device would likely be more complex than our
simulated attack, and our approach may not be as effective at helping an analyst
discover evidences of the attack. Additionally, we do not know for certain that our
approach would helpful for developing countermeasures against the other attacks
mentioned in this paper. If an analyst could collect enough information from a device
to identify anomalous activities associated with a specific attack, such as with our own
simulated attack, then he or she could begin devising incident response mechanisms
as a countermeasure to that attack, but we cannot say for certain that our approach
can identify those anomalous activities.
Another limitation of our approach is that the on-device application can only
operate on the iOS platform. We originally chose to design our on-device application
for the iOS platform since the original devices we were examining in our preliminary
investigation were iOS devices. Unfortunately, many corporations use Android or
61
Blackberry devices for business-related communications, and with those corporations
our on-device application would be inapplicable. Additionally, although we were
able to successfully obtain various pieces of information from an iOS device to use for
analysis, it is not guaranteed that the same information would be available on another
platform, which also means that what we demonstrated through the simulated attack
may not be as relevant. Additionally, because commercial forensics tools have different
capabilities depending on the platform, we cannot guarantee that using an on-device
application to collect information over time would provide the same benefit on other
platforms as it did on iOS, since a commercial forensics tool could allow for an effective
analysis of the device in and of itself.
The most notable limitation with our approach is with the amount of information
we are able to collect using the on-device application. Naturally there are more areas
of information that we would like to draw from using our on-device application, but we
are unable to do so due to the restrictive nature of the iOS platform. The iOS platform
implements a security feature known as application sandboxing, which according to
Apple’s documentation [21] is a kernel-level mechanism that restricts the data and
resources that any third-party applications have access to. Specifically, applications
that are sandboxed are unable to access data or resources that are particular to any
other application, including first party applications. According to Bucicoiu et al.
the sandboxing mechanism is primarily handled by a TrustedBSD mandatory access
control module at the kernel level, which “enforces sandboxing at the level of system
calls and directory paths” [22]. A good example of how this restriction limits our
approach is with attempts to access SMS data. As previously mentioned, according
to the paper by Han et al. some attacks on the iOS platform take advantage of the
SMS service and attempt to charge the user premium rate messages without being
detected [7]. If, however, we were able to keep track of the messages sent from the
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SMS application and also see when the malicious SMS messages were sent by looking
at the running processes, we could compare the time-stamps on the messages with
the times that the SMS process was active and identify any malicious anomalies using
our analysis program.
One possible solution to our problem of data restriction on iOS is to create ad-
ditional applications and features that can be used to produce substitute or supple-
mentary data for analysis. We can see how an additional application can help with
analysis when considering our simulated SSID spoofing attack. When looking at the
results, we can see that the device’s connection to a specific foreign address was sus-
picious because the connection occurred on a network that was only active during a
short period of time, which made it anomalous. Looking at the actual log files we can
also see that the SSID of the suspicious network varies only slightly from the non-
suspicious network, and from both of these pieces of evidence we can conclude that
the anomalous network was set up in an attempt to spoof a legitimate network; how-
ever, we can reach this same conclusion with a higher level of confidence if we consider
further evidence that corroborates it. One way to do this is to determine what URLs
the user had entered when connecting to the foreign addresses. If we could show that
the URL entered into the browser while connected to the first network was the same
as the URL while connected to the second network, we could conclude with more
confidence that the logs show evidence of an SSID spoof attack since the BSSID’s of
the network connections were different. Although we can see from the web browser
screen shots that the user entered “http://www.good.site” into the search bar, only
the foreign address of the second network connection shows evidence of that URL
according to the log files as seen in Figure 5.1.
Developing another application to collect the entered URLs is a good way to
provide the supplemental information that we would need to conclude with a higher
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Figure 5.1: Comparing Foreign Addresses of Different Network Connections
degree of confidence that the evidence shown in the analysis program is indicative of
an SSID spoof attack. Due to the iOS sandbox policy, our on-device application that
was used to continuously collect information in our attack simulation did not have
access to the history of the browser that we used, and as a result, it did not log the
URLs. Naturally, one would then question how an additional application would be
able to obtain the data that the data collection application could not. Simply put,
it cannot since it falls under the same restrictions as the first application; however,
because we are designing a proof-of-concept system intended to aid companies in
securing the data on their mobile devices, we have some freedom in dictating how
those devices should be secured, meaning we can suggest policies for device usage
that would accompany our design for security. If then we create our own web browser
application, we could both gain additional information from the browser and ensure
that the users would actually use it, since we could recommend its usage as part of a
security policy.
Although it would be difficult to develop a web browser with the same function-
ality as those commonly used on iOS such as Safari or Google Chrome, it is possible
to develop a rudimentary browser with basic security features. We developed such
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Figure 5.2: Browser Application Screen Shot
a browser application, and although we never used it when carrying out the simu-
lated attack, we can still describe its effectiveness when used alongside our on-device
collection application. Figure 5.2 shows a screen shot of our browser application.
If we know ahead of time that the user will use our browser application instead
of a commercial browser, then we can program functionality that would send any
information private to the application to our remote server, including the browser
history. Had this been the case with our simulated attack, we would have been able to
determine that the URL of the foreign address on the first network matched the URL
of the foreign address on the second network, even though the foreign addresses were
different. Considering this along with the facts that the two networks had different
BSSIDs, similar SSIDs, and that one network was related to anomalous browsing
activity, an analyst could have determined with an even higher level of confidence
that the simulated attack was an attempt to spoof the SSID of a non-malicious
network.
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In regards to future work, our approach can be expanded upon by improving our
on-device application to continuously collect more types of information, such as SMS
information or device settings information. Porting the application to other mobile
platforms could also prove useful as it would allow for the exploration of the effec-
tiveness of continual data collection on platforms besides iOS. Through our analysis
program, we demonstrated how Euclidean distance and Levenshtein distance calcula-
tions can be used to aid a forensic analysis, but there may be other calculations that
can be made that take advantage of the additional context gained from continuous
data collection. Adding more calculations to the analysis program would only improve
the level of confidence with which an analyst could make conclusions. Furthermore,
we used a single simulated attack to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
It stands to reason, therefore, that simulations of other types of attacks or real-world
usage could help improve our tools by demonstrating their effectiveness even further
or highlighting areas in which they can be improved.
We can see that there is potential for expanding our approach through the ad-
dition or improvement of specific features in our iOS application; however we can
also expand our approach by considering implementation on other platforms, such
as Android. Naturally one of the biggest concerns we would have when considering
porting our application to another platform would be whether or not we could achieve
the same goals that we can achieve with our iOS implementation; however, because
Android has fewer restrictive security features than iOS, we would likely be able to
continuously collect a sufficient amount of information to effectively assist a forensic
analyst. This can be seen in the paper by paper by Justin Grover in which he details
how his Android monitoring application is able to collect a variety of different types
of data including, but not limited to, application installation times, browser history,
browser searches, calendar events, call logs, contacts, location settings, incoming and
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outgoing SMS messages, and information from third-party logging applications [12].
According to the paper, an Android monitoring application can in fact gather an even
greater variety of different types of information than an iOS monitoring application.
Like iOS, Android also has a sandbox security feature that inherently restricts an
application’s access to assets from another application unless explicitly given. The
difference, though, is that there are many more permissions available to an Android
application than there are to an iOS application. One example is that applications
on Android can request permissions to a specific web browser application upon in-
stallation which would allow the application to access browser history and browser
search information as demonstrated in [12]. Additionally Android allows developers
to specify permissions regarding their own applications which other applications can
request to gain access to assets from those applications [23]. This feature would then
allow applications to collaborate their data locally instead of needing to use an out-
side server, which was the case with our application on iOS. Overall it seems that in
terms of data collection, the Android platform is suited for performing all the tasks
that our on-device application performs on iOS and more.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
We have developed an on-device application for the iOS platform to continuously
collect information about the state of the device, such as current network connections
and active processes, every few seconds. The information collected is sent to a remote
server where it is separated into log files to be used with the analysis program we
created. The analysis program can perform correlation and anomaly distance calcu-
lations on the collected data that can help an analyst in drawing conclusions about
whether or not any malicious activity had occurred on the device. We also simulated
a potential network attack on a test iOS device running our application and demon-
strated how an analyst could use the tools we developed, in addition to commercial
forensics tools, to efficiently reason to an accurate conclusion.
The primary contribution of this research thesis is that it shows how continuously
collecting information from a mobile device can lead to a more complete set of evi-
dence which can then be used to improve a forensic analysis. We initially demonstrate
the usefulness of a forensic analysis in regards to securing data on mobile devices by
highlighting some of the weaknesses in modern Mobile Device Management systems,
particularly their inability to detect intrusions or compromises. To support this claim
we reference various papers that describe attacks carried out against mobile systems
and give hypothetical procedures as to how an analyst could use forensics to aid in
the discovery of those attacks. We continue to explore the effectiveness of forensic
techniques in regards to mobile security by conducting a preliminary forensic investi-
gation from which we find that traditional commercial forensic tools, although useful,
do not necessarily give an analyst enough information to draw a conclusion with a
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high level of confidence. Supplementing this information with continuously collected
information from the device, however, makes the evidence more complete by adding
more context for it, since an analyst can now know how different parts of the evidence
relate to each other over time. Although other works have suggested that having more
context of the collected information can lead to more accurate conclusions, we show
precisely how this can be accomplished by using distance calculations to correlate dif-
ferent data elements and detect anomalous data, and we demonstrate its effectiveness
with a simulated data set.
Regarding the future work of our approach, we have shown how, like with similar
applications on other mobile platforms, there is still the potential to collect more
types of data to be used in a forensic analysis. Naturally, the restrictive nature of the
iOS platform could make this advancement challenging, but not impossible if we can
use additional applications to collect data. Additionally, it is also feasible that we
would be able to port our approach over to the Android platform. Some monitoring
applications similar to ours already exist on Android, but unlike existing applications,
our approach uses a sophisticated analysis tool to produce statistics useful for drawing
conclusions with a high level of confidence.
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